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  This article provides a critique of military aerial drones being 
“repurposed” as domestic security technologies.  Mapping this process in 
regards to domestic policing agencies in the United States, the case of police 
drones speaks directly to the importation of actual military and colonial 
architectures into the routine spaces of the “homeland”, disclosing insidious 
entwinements of war and police, metropole and colony, accumulation and 
securitization.  The “boomeranging” of military UAVs is but one contemporary 
example how war power and police power have long been allied and it is the 
logic of security and the practice of pacification that animates both.  The police 
drone is but one of the most nascent technologies that extends or reproduces 
the police’s own design on the pacification of territory.  Therefore, we must be 
careful not to fetishize the domestic police drone by framing this development 
as emblematic of a radical break from traditional policing mandates – the case of 
police drones is interesting less because it speaks about the militarization of the 
police, which it certainly does, but more about the ways in which it accentuates 
the mutual mandates and joint rationalities of war abroad and policing at home.  
Finally, the paper considers how the animus of police drones is productive of a 
particular form of organized suspicion, namely, the manhunt.   Here, the 
“unmanning” of police power extends the police capability to not only see or 
know its dominion, but to quite literally track, pursue, and ultimately capture 
human prey.   
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Why, oh why must you swoop through the hood  
Like everybody from the hood is up to no good 
Run, run, run from the ghetto bird Run. 
 Ice Cube, “Ghetto Bird” (1993)    
 
 
 In the name of “security,” battlefronts bleed into home fronts as military 
technologies charged with the pacification of foreign others “outside” national space are 
tasked with the pacification of others on the “inside.”  This is perhaps most evident with 
the emergence of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or aerial surveillance drones, as 
they migrate from the securityscapes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to the United 
States “homeland”.  Known for their powerful surveillance cameras, thermal imaging, 
hovering capabilities, aerial flexibility and, depending on the model, destructive missile 
strike capabilities, drones have emerged as a contemporary icon of the cutting edge of air 
power.  US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta once stated that drones are “the only game 
in town” in terms of combatting “terrorism” (Shachtman, 2009) – a logic embraced by an 
Obama administration seemingly undeterred from accumulating civilian deaths while 
expanding and ramping up drone attacks premised on a secretive “kill list” of “suspected 
terrorists,” (Becker and Shane, 2012) including US citizens (Cole, 2011).  Clearly, aerial 
drones are not merely a game, as Panetta would have it, but indeed a bloody business 
mobilized by the imperatives of security and accumulation. Yet the drone market is not 
confined to foreign theaters, as the US security state and security industries are 
increasingly imagining drones as “dual-use” scopic technologies that can readily be 
deployed across a myriad of spatial contexts removed from foreign policy, at least on the 
surface (see Wall and Monahan, 2011). One such context is the policing of domestic 
order, especially what is commonly but problematically referred to as routine “law 
enforcement” or “crime fighting”.  That is, military aerial drones are now being 
“repurposed” as domestic security technologies.    
As the case of aerial drones demonstrate, in fundamental ways the contemporary 
politics of security is routinely measured through a “technological fix”, most commonly 
through a visual prosthetics pregnant with the possibility of violence (Feldman, 1997). 
This fixation on seeing, knowing, and ordering through optical enhancement can also be 
seen with the ubiquitous information and biometric technology such as body scans, facial 
recognition systems, smart cards, national ID cards, cell-phone tracking devices, 
geospatial satellite-tracking devices, Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV), and a plethora of 
other technologies aimed at collecting “intelligence.”  All of these coercive looking 
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technologies convert information into “intelligence” through the mediating capacities of 
screens, databases, and networks that function by abstracting bodies from their local 
contexts to facilitate various interventions (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000).  Just like UAV 
systems, all of the above technologies have been and are currently deployed in both 
“counter-insurgency” and domestic policing operations – suggesting that these 
technologies never solely belong to the domestic order, but to the order of security and 
pacification.  This order is rooted in the “boomerang effect”, whereby control 
technologies deployed abroad in colonial and military campaigns “boomerang” back to 
the metropole to be deployed against “homefront” populations (Graham, 2010; Foucault, 
1997; McCoy, 2009).   
 The case of police drones speaks directly to the importation of actual military and 
colonial architectures into the routine spaces of the “homeland”, disclosing insidious 
entwinements of war and police, metropole and colony, accumulation and securitization. 
Yet the pervasive trafficking of technologies between military and police are often met 
with a persistent denial, namely, the normalization of a pervasive assumption that 
imagines “colonial frontiers and Western ‘homelands’ as fundamentally separate 
domains” rather than seeing these spaces as “fuse(d) together into a seamless whole” 
(Graham, 2010: xix).  But, as I attempt to demonstrate, it would simplistic and misleading 
to suggest that the pacification of foreign populations and securing of global markets, to 
which military drones have played an important part of late (see Benjamin, 2012; Turse 
and Englehardt, 2012), is somehow removed from the pacification of domestic territory 
and securing of markets on the “inside.” Although at the time of this writing unmanned 
vertical policing is not yet widespread, making the analysis here admittedly speculative, 
my purpose here is to demonstrate the union of war power abroad and police power at 
home.  Police drones then must be understood as continuous, and in no way detached or 
dissimilar, from contemporary US pacification projects in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan. The article therefore unpacks how police UAVs, like the military drone, are 
bounded by the logic of security and the practice of pacification as these vertical tracking 
technologies are tasked with the hunting of human prey. In this sense, police drones 
underline the unmanning of the police manhunt, that foundational practice of police 
power where the “reserve army of labour” is quite literally hunted and captured. 
 
The Rise of Drone Patrols  
 
 Unmanned military commodities routinely create profits for the US security 
industry, with the hunt for locating new “internal” drone markets yet another instance of 
this, alongside the removal of “obstacles” to capital accumulation.   This is one face of the 
perpetual hunt for new markets (Marx, 1867/1976).  Faced with the fear of future budget 
cuts and pending wars, the US security state and partnered security industries are 
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persistently manufacturing “adjacent markets,” or any civilian market where military 
technologies can be peddled (Lake, 2011).  A defense executive has stated that the 
industry goal for military ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] 
technologies is “to push it down to the state and local governments to see if there is a 
mission to support” (cited in Lake, 2011).   Importantly, the “mission support” mentioned 
by the above executive is the “public safety market,” as a different defense executive states: 
“a number of our influential products have dual-use capability to locations and missions 
adjacent to our primary overseas ISR mission. One such example is local law 
enforcement, emergency first responders and border protection” (cited in Lake, 2011).   
The military drone is at the forefront of the so-called green-to-blue pipeline, or the 
movement from military to domestic security applications. 
Prior to 2012 there had been one major obstacle to domesticating drones, namely, 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations blocking widespread access to 
national airspace by both public and private institutions.  In February 2012 this obstacle, 
if not completely demolished, was reworked into a much less significant impediment with 
passage of H.R. 658, a law requiring the FAA to expedite the process of handing out 
Certificate of Authorizations (COAs) to government agencies such as the police and 
border patrol and also private enterprises so that they can operate micro-drones.  It has 
been estimated that by 2018, there could be 30, 000 drones flying in US skies – a mixture 
of military, public safety, and private drones (Smithson, 2012).  The passing of the bill was 
largely due to sustained pressure by drone stakeholders, primarily Congress’s Unmanned 
Systems Caucus, the Association of Unmanned Vehicles International (AUVSI) and its 
corporate members, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), various lawmakers, and 
domestic policing agencies.  These stakeholders argued that the lack of access to US 
airspace was a hindrance to both capital accumulation and much needed security 
measures. As a spokesperson for the AUVSI has stated, “The potential civil market for 
these systems could dwarf the military market in the coming years if we can get access to 
the airspace.”  Michael Huerta, an FAA administrator, has stated: “What we’re hearing 
from the Congress and the industry is, ‘This technology is evolving quickly and we don’t 
want the FAA to be too cautious so as to hold up technological innovation” (quoted in 
Lowy, 2012).   
Unsurprisingly, “public safety” agencies across the US have embraced this move 
to “re-purpose” and “re-deploy” military-style UAVs, specifically micro-drones weighing 
from 4-25 pounds and from 2-8 feet in length.  A Texas official has stated, “Public-safety 
agencies are beginning to see this as an invaluable tool for them, just as the car was an 
improvement over the horse and the single-shot pistol was improved upon by the six-
shooter” (Clarridge, 2012).  To police drone enthusiasts, UAV systems evoke a 
“technological sublime” (Nye, 1994), or a certain reverence, awe, and arousal concerning 
great engineering feats and technologies.  In this case, drones are a technological sublime 
that points to the dream of securing the insecurity of domestic order.  Outfitted with 
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potent cameras and potentially night vision, facial recognition, thermal imaging and even 
lethal and non-lethal weaponry, drones are said to be a dreamlike, “silver-bullet” scopic 
commodity animating the fantasy of security. Police micro-UAVs have been imagined for 
a plethora of circumstances: natural disaster assistance, search and rescue, special events 
and other large gatherings such as protests, traffic congestion and enforcement, high 
speed pursuits, locating fleeing/hiding suspects, hostage rescue and barricaded subjects, 
drug interdiction, and in surveillance/intelligence operations.  Indeed, the police 
applications of this appear endless, with innovation a likely outcome of their adoption in 
everyday police practices.  As one spokesperson for a local government that purchased a 
drone remarked, “As we get into this we’ll be able to find more uses for it” (Butts, 2012).   
Perhaps the most well-known case of domestic UAVs is the implementation of 
drones by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the aerial monitoring of US 
border regions with Mexico and Canada (Becker, 2012; Rockwell, 2011).  Currently, the 
CBP has 9 drones with plans for more in the future (Dinan, 2012).  But drones are also 
emerging beyond the seams of US borderscapes as increasing numbers of US police 
departments are seeking military-style aerial drones as key domestic policing 
technologies. To list only a few examples, drones have been acquired by FAA 
authorizations or have been applied for by policing agencies in Seattle, Colorado, Texas, 
Maryland, California, North Dakota, Florida, South Carolina, Alabama, Utah, Idaho, and 
Arkansas. For instance, Miami-Dade police received a grant from the Department of 
Justice in order to acquire 2 Honeywell T-Hawk drones, at $50,000 each, that can fly and 
hover at altitudes up to 9000 feet.  The local government of Canyon County, Idaho 
purchased a Draganfkyer X6 with DHS grants (Butts 2012).  Like other similar drones, 
the Draganflyer X6 can stream video to officers on the ground and also comes equipped 
with thermal imaging technology. The Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) has four 
Wasp III drones that reportedly are available on a case-by-case basis to any policing 
agency in the state (Newton, 2011).  In October of 2011 the Sheriff’s Department in 
Montgomery County, Texas, also with assistance from DHS grants, unveiled a 7-foot long 
drone called the “Shadowhawk”.  This particular drone, from Texas-based Vanguard 
Industries, is equipped with cameras and heat sensor and night vision technology and the 
platform can be armed with “non-lethal” and “lethal” weaponry.   As of May 2012, it was 
reported that the Shadowhawk had yet to be deployed, but officials stated that they were 
waiting for the “right incident” to “present itself” (Flake, 2012).  It is not an 
understatement to say that both the idea and the reality of police drones have become 
normalized in policing circles. As one New York Police Department (NYPD) 
spokesperson puts it, drones just “aren’t that exotic anymore” (CBS, 2012).     
Despite all of these developments, the opening of the police drone market has 
been met with critiques from liberals and conservatives alike, ranging from concerns 
about safety concerns such as mid-air collisions and loss of signal scenarios, even though 
the issue of privacy, unsurprisingly and problematically, has dominated popular critiques 
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(see Henry, this volume).  For the security industry these issues are to be solved through 
“public relations”.  Speaking at a Counter Terror Expo, a government official stated that 
“We have a very tall challenge to change public perception.  Otherwise, we’ll be stopped 
cold in our tracks if we don’t do this thoughtfully.  We have to bring the public along 
every step of the way” so that they realize “we will not be watching backyards” (Stone, 
2012).  Indeed, going so far as to hire a public relations firm to “bombard the American 
public with positive images and messages” (Morley, 2012), the AUVSI has admitted that 
one of the big challenges for the emergence of domestic UAVs is winning “hearts and 
minds”. An AUVSI spokesperson has stated that “We’re going to do a much better job of 
educating people about unmanned aviation, the good and the bad.  We’re working on 
drafting the right message and how to get it out there.  You have to keep repeating the 
good words.  People who don’t know what they’re talking about say these are spy planes 
or killer drones.  They’re not” (Morley, 2012).  But it is important to note that the 
majority of military UAVs are primarily equipped for aerial surveillance and intelligence-
gathering, and are not equipped with lethal systems and are not nearly the size of the 
Predator and Reaper “hunter-killer” drones that have received most attention – hence 
there are more commonalities between military drones and police drones than this 
spokesperson suggests.  Indeed, one suggested solution to successfully normalize drones 
in national airspace is to cease calling the technology “drones”, but rather “remotely 
piloted vehicles” (Morley, 2012) because the word “drone” is so associated with targeted 
assassinations, kill lists, and dead civilians.    
Clearly, the rise of police drones reveals a bundle of issues concerning 
technologies of violence, questions of security and the powers of marketing. How might 
we understand the police drone, without falling back on liberal worries about ‘safety 
concerns’ or loss privacy? How might we situate the drone within the wider frame of the 
critique of security and the logic of pacification? 
 
Security Fetishism & Insecurity as Opportunity   
 
 Animated by the fetish of security (Neocleous 2008), the rise of US police drones 
exemplify how logics of (in)security circulate and proliferate so creating new 
configurations of state power and accumulation.  Although police officials justify drones 
by claiming they are cheaper than helicopters and better protect officers from “harm’s 
way”, discourses of security remain the most forceful argument, as police officials 
routinely exclaim drones offer an extra layer of “public safety”.  Prior to the passing of 
H.R. 658, New York Democrat Charles Schumer stated that the domestication of UAVs is 
ultimately a matter of “national security”:   
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The FAA has been very hesitant to give authorization to these UAVs due 
to limited air space and restrictions that they have.  I certainly can 
appreciate those concerns; but when we’re talking about Customs and 
Border Protection or the FBI, what have you, we are talking about missions 
of national security.  And certainly there’s nothing more important than 
that (quoted in Barry 2012; emphasis mine).  
 
Unmanned police power then can firmly be situated in what Feldman (2004) dubs 
“securocratic wars of public safety” where national security and public safety concerns 
converge and become inseparable.  As “the supreme concept of bourgeois society”, as 
Marx once put it (cited in Neocleous, 2008: 30), and a “general economy of power” as 
Foucault (2007: 10-11) suggested, security exercises an insidious mutability and 
malleability, and both writers also recognized the securing of insecurity as always 
unfinished and perpetual.  Consequently, the “war on terrorism” slides into those other 
perpetual security projects, such as the “war on crime” and “war on drugs”, while 
homeland security, public safety, and national security become interchangeable – hence 
the normalized overlapping techniques of military and police power in which drones are 
but one example.  
Both imperial and domestic police UAVs are first and foremost security 
commodities invested in and bounded by the prerogatives of security and accumulation, 
accentuating how security becomes commodified in neoliberal “risk markets” (Rigakos, 
2002).  If the commodity form is said to address or alleviate some form of human need, 
and the security commodity specifically that of insecurity, then the police drone addresses 
the local security state’s need, or desire or dream, of pacifying territory and populations 
(Neocleous, 2011).  Police agencies turn to security industries in order to better enhance 
their security objectives while security industries aggressively market military products to 
“public safety” institutions in order to secure accumulation.  That is, the emergence of 
police drones speak to the ways the security state and security industries are virtually 
indistinguishable, as attested to above with the entanglement of the AUVSI, DHS, 
Congressional Unmanned Caucus, policing agencies, and the FAA’s relinquishing of the 
control of airspace due to the intertwined imperatives of security and accumulation.   
This entails not so much the retreat or “hollowing-out” of the state or a 
privatization of the state, but a security industry intimately intertwined with the state (see 
Neocleous, 2008).  The state appears as “pimp” (Zedner, 2006) to an increasingly 
powerful security industry, with local police forces the main client. And yet there is no 
clear separation between the security provided by the pimp and the commodity sold by 
the prostitute.  Much like the “child protection industry” (Katz, 2001), drone industries, 
and security corporations in general, do not produce and market security commodities 
such as UAVs because they are particularly interested in surveillance and security per se, 
but first and foremost because they are interested in accumulation (Neocleous, 2008).  Yet 
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they also recognize that to secure accumulation, a healthy security state must be forged 
and nourished.   
As attempts to domesticate drones suggest, the logic of security presupposes a 
social order or even local context that is haunted by the spectre of insecurity.  That is, 
police drone stakeholders are reliant on the presence of what could be thought of as 
“opportunities of insecurity” that are often tragic, transgressive, or perceived as 
“disorderly” to help justify the continual reproduction, circulation, and intensification of 
the security-accumulation assemblage.  Here it is useful to think of this in terms of the 
“disaster capitalism” outlined by Naomi Klein (2007), in which human and 
environmental devastation is seen as an occasion for state power and capitalist 
accumulation to expand. As Klein shows, “homeland security” itself is largely an 
economy where unchecked police powers and unchecked capitalism insidiously converge 
after “9/11” (386).  This point on disaster capitalism in reference to police drones is 
poignantly demonstrated by the following graphic by Lucintel, a market research group:   
 
 
As the column above demonstrates, diverse and random events, most of them 
tragic or transgressive in that lives have been injured and/or order breached, are framed 
as not upsetting or disconcerting in terms of human suffering or harm, but as the 
necessary conditions for “growth” of the UAV civil market.   Reworked as “requirements” 
and “opportunities,” these various events ranging from forest fires to automobile 
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accidents, from criminalized activity to an influx in foot or vehicular traffic, are 
understood as the required conditions of possibility for the domestic drone market.  And 
as the middle column shows, these opportunities to capitalize on tragedy and 
transgression are structured by the uncertain and unpredictable, the ambiguous and 
illegible, as they play out on a local scale.  In addition, the column on the right points to 
how the intertwined logics of security and insecurity, order and disorder, animates the 
whole process, as the pursuit of security is understood as perpetual and can never be 
achieved.  The spectre of blindness and ignorance haunts or animates security to develop 
and deploy greater capabilities to “see” and “order”.   
Police drones are but one useful case study demonstrating how the security state 
and security industries are reliant upon, and actively propagate and mobilize fear, 
suspicion, and anxiety around “public safety” issues to simultaneously justify hardened 
security measures and secure accumulation.  Of course, this is nothing new per se, but is 
just one example of the ways in which demands for security are at once demands for 
accumulation (Katz, 2001; Rigakos, 2002; Spitzer, 1987).  Indeed, security capitalizes on 
devastation and insecurity by converting them into a plethora of opportunities for state 
power, social order and capitalist accumulation to be bolstered and reproduced (Cowen 
and Siciliano, 2011; Feldman, 2011).  Thus Cowen and Siciliano speak of a “securitized 
social reproduction” whereby individual bodies, groups, asymmetrical social relations, 
and the larger order of capitalist accumulation are secured through classed and racialized 
practices of targeted policing.  This process, I suggest, needs to be understood as central 
to the process of pacification. The remainder of this article thinks through the cultural 
and political dynamics configuring the domestic deployment of police drones in this 
light.  I suggest that aerial police drones are nothing less than a human hunting 
technology in the service of pacification.   
 
Pacification, Scopic Verticality and the Manhunt   
 
 Police drones are often described as part of a long history of police 
“militarization” where both martial vocabularies and military practices and technologies 
(Kraska, 2001) abound within modern policing’s “technostructure” (Haggerty and 
Ericson, 2001).  Yet as tempting as the militarization discourse is we must resist seeing the 
boomeranging of military drones to the policing of domestic populations as solely an 
issue where martial logics and technologies straightforwardly convert police power into 
war power.  The militarization discourse often lends itself to a problematic “blurring” 
trope where the military invades and corrupts, “militarizes”, the previously noble police 
profession.  As Guillermina Seri (2012) argues, “There is a distinct police role in 
facilitating authoritarianism and state violence” (119), and this is precisely what is missed 
in discussions of the militarization of the police. The police and military might operate 
40
Socialist Studies / Études socialistes 9 (2) Winter 2013  
 
with “different notions of risk” such as arrest/prosecution as opposed to simply kill 
(Hallsworth and Lea, 2011: 151), yet insisting on this divide obscures the fact that war and 
police have long been sutured together in the name of security.  That is, the 
boomeranging of military UAVs is but one contemporary example how war power and 
police power have long been allied, and it is the logic of security and the practice of 
pacification that animates both (Neocleous, 2011; Neocleous, this volume).   
Most often pacification is evoked in regards to military strategy and tactics, 
primarily in reference to counter-insurgency efforts to “win hearts and minds” in the 
US/Vietnam war – although it has a much longer colonial history (Neocleous, 2011).  But 
as others have pointed out, the “external pacification” of distant territories and peoples 
has historically developed alongside the “internal pacification” of domestic territories and 
populations (see Kuzmarov, 2012; McCoy, 2009), the former primarily being consigned 
to the military whereas the latter a policing project.  In his ethnography of the LAPD, 
Herbert (1997) identifies police surveillance as one important means by which the police 
routinely aim for “internal pacification.” In this regard internal pacification can be 
understood as a “process fabricating a ‘peace and security’ within the social order to 
match the ‘peace and security’ imposed on colonial subjects” while “ordering the social 
relations of power around a particular regime of accumulation” (Neocleous, 2011).   
Security is pacification (Neocleous, 2011).  As a critical concept, pacification therefore 
also forces us to ask questions about who is being pacified, why this is so, and for what 
particular objectives, while simultaneously presupposing subjects that resist efforts at 
their pacification (Rigakos, 2011).   
In other words, the usefulness in thinking the politics of security in terms of 
pacification is that the military and police are located on a continuum of state power, 
aiming to order disorder with quite similar practices and hardware, as opposed to two 
separate spheres with different operating logics (see Rigakos, 2011).  In this light, we must 
be careful not to fetishize the domestic police drone by framing this development as 
emblematic of a radical break from traditional policing mandates – the case of police 
drones is interesting less because it speaks about the militarization of the police, which it 
certainly does, but more about the ways in which it accentuates the mutual mandates and 
joint rationalities of war and police.  Put in a slightly different way, the police drone is but 
one of the newest technologies that extends or reproduces the police’s own design on the 
pacification of its territory.  Indeed, the military and police are united in their mandate to 
pacify their respective territories and populations (Herbert, 1997).  For certain, 
surveillance and intelligence-gathering, and the continual threat of violence, structure the 
organizational animus of not only militaries but also domestic policing – an animus 
moved by the “demand for order” (Silver, 1976). But such “order” is not only reproduced 
but also actively fabricated by police power (Neocleous, 2000). Much like the police 
helicopters armed with powerful high-resolution cameras, flying above city streets, 
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sidewalks, alleyways, parks, homes and lawns, unmanned vertical policing extends the 
police dream of pacification through air power, or a scopic verticality.   
Importantly, as a technology of pacification the drone must be understood, in its 
logic and design, as a technology of police and not merely military power. The police 
drone, on this view, is not a feature of police “militarization”, but a technology already 
structured by police logic – and here I am referring to the broad notion of the “social 
police” that predates yet still structures the uniformed institution now thought of as “the 
police” (Neocleous, 2000; see also Foucault 2007).  That is, air power has long been a form 
of police power in that the inauguration of modern air power, the 1920’s and 1930’s, was 
defined by the police concept (Neocleous, 2013a).  Put another way: although most 
histories of air power trace its origins to military power, often speaking of WWII as the 
crucial historical moment, Neocleous (2013a) demonstrates how air power was originally 
conceived by its earliest proponents in Britain and the US as an explicit police technology 
to be used to govern in the most general sense the colonized and other “dangerous 
classes”.  More specifically, he shows how in the 1920s many of the debates taking place in 
metropoles concerning colonial populations framed air power as a police technology 
deployed to pacify indigenous peoples and fabricate order by crushing rebellions and 
policing minor resistances, separating the indigenous from traditional means of 
production, conducting aerial surveillance including land surveys and censuses, and in 
winning hearts and mind through moral effect.   Of course, air power as police power was 
not only discussed – but actually exercised by metropoles in the “securing” of a slew of 
colonized territories.  Perhaps most relevant to note for our discussion of police drones in 
the US is the 1921 “Battle of Blair Mountain”, when West Virginian coal miners were 
aerially bombed by the private militia of mine owners, to say nothing of the military 
planes that were also used to conduct reconnaissance.  Most recently, the 1985 bombing 
from a police helicopter of the headquarters of the activist organization MOVE helps in 
further demonstrating that air power has in fact long been a form of police power. The 
drone belongs to this history.    
UAVs are said to better assist police with their goal of rendering illegible 
geographies legible from above.  “An illegible society”, Scott writes, “is a hindrance to any 
effective intervention by the state, whether the purpose of that intervention is plunder or 
public welfare” (Scott 1998: 78).  As Ericson and Haggerty (1997) have shown, the 
domestic policing of insecurity, just like the military sibling, involves the collecting of 
information regarding a population and territory with aims of constructing “a more 
accurate map of the territory and a more reasonable profile of the…people who inhabit 
it” (135).  As an “extra patrolman in the sky” (Miller, 2011) that is mobile and flexible, the 
police UAV extends the police mandate of ordering terrestrial space by technologically 
mediating the territorial through the aerial – “vigilant visualities” (Amoore, 2007) take 
flight within a politics of verticality (Weizman, 2007).  The drone patrol lends itself to 
visually ordering what appears disordered if observed solely from eye-level, or ground-
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level – the terrestrial patrol is always limited by its locality. In this sense the drone is like 
the police helicopter. Of police helicopters, Adey (2010) writes that “Verticality implies 
security from the insecurities below” (58; emphasis in original), and this logic certainly 
structures the drone stare. One police official has stated drones provide “a good 
opportunity to have an eye up there” and that the technology provides “a surveilling eye 
to help us to do the things we need to do, honestly, to keep people safe” (quoted in 
Benjamin, 2012).  In this sense, police drones are said to provide earth-bound police 
officers with a superior aerial vantage point in order to negotiate risks, threats, and 
disorders through the aerial distancing of subject and object.  UAVs, enthusiasts therefore 
claim, provide much-needed public safety interventions by producing better state 
knowledge. This reproduces the commonsensical refrain that the state is “the knowing 
subject” (Neocleous, 2003), even though what is often taken as seeing better or more – 
legibility – is actually itself always a partial view, or a simplification and miniaturization 
that excludes other forms of knowledge (Scott, 1998).  As Feldman (1997) states: “The 
circuit formed by vision and violence is itself circumscribed by zones of blindness and 
inattention” (Feldman 1997: 29). 
It is not simply a detached aerial view of an entire city that is imagined by police, 
but also the ability to intervene on a local level.  Much like air power in combat, the police 
pursuit of mastering the atmosphere converges with a desire for an “unblinking eye – an 
omnipresent view provided by efficient UAV cycles and sequences that seeks to observe 
an asymmetric yet omnipresent threat with the capacity to unpredictably surprise and 
disrupt” (Adey et al, 2011: 179).  No matter how high the UAV soars in order for the 
police to gain an ocular superiority, it is important to remember that since the aerial view 
is always tethered to the ground it is never merely ocular. Rather, it is a “vision that is 
practiced and touched” (Adey, 2010: 109).  This touch, I suggest, is realized in the 
culmination of a particular form of organized suspicion, namely, the manhunt.  
Chamayou (2011) has recently argued that the aerial drone is the contemporary 
emblem of the militarized manhunt.  Hence the foundational structure of the “war on 
terror” is not a Clauswitzian duel between states, but the asymmetrical hunt for human 
prey. Here we could mention the quite literal hunts for Bin Laden and other suspected 
insurgents, Saddam Hussein after the 2003 invasion, and of course the “targeted killings” 
of suspected enemies on a drone “kill list”, including US citizens.   Key to the chase is the 
process of identification leading the hunter to the location of the hunted for either 
capture or killing, but primarily for the latter.  The hunt has been a central component of 
pacification and accumulation (Neocleous, this volume), and as already stated, the drone 
is the quintessential emblem of this new “manhunt doctrine” of contemporary warfare 
(Chamayou, 2011).   The drone,  
 
…is the mechanical, flying and robotic heir of the dog of war.  It creates to 
perfection the ideal of asymmetry: to be able to kill without being able to 
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be killed; to be able to see without being seen.  To become absolutely 
invulnerable while the other is placed in a state of absolute vulnerability.  
‘Predator’, ‘Global Hawk’, ‘Reaper’ – birds of prey and angels of death, 
drones bear their names well (Chamayou, 2011).  
 
The drone, then, is a technology of manhunting, and this is true whether the drone in 
question is solely capable of surveillance or one of the “hunter-killer” drones equipped 
with Hellfire missiles.  The drone is oriented to both the “capture” of state-produced 
images and the capture of those marked as Other.  Historically though, the state-
sanctioned manhunt has configured the animus of domestic policing more so than it has 
organized military violence abroad (see Chamayou, 2011; 2012; Neocleous, 2013b).  That 
is, the state’s deployment of the manhunt has historically belonged more to police than 
the military.  Therefore, keeping with the argument made in the previous section that air 
power has long been police power, we can say that the unmanned military hunts so 
clearly important to the war on terror belong not only to the logic of war, but to the logic 
of police.   
On this note, we might find it helpful to understand drones as not only a hunting 
technology in the service of external pacification, but a relation of domination animating 
the very heart of police power (Chamayou, 2012; Neocleous, 2013). A consideration of 
manhunting as an actual relation between dominant and dominated is to take seriously 
“technologies of predation indispensable for the establishment and reproduction of 
relationships of domination” (Chamayou, 2012: 1).  As the “state’s arm of pursuit, 
entrusted by it with tracking, arresting, and imprisoning”, Chamayou (2012) writes, 
policing is a hunting institution claiming a “monopoly on legitimate tracking” and 
capture (89).   Policing as a human hunting institution is grounded in the historical and 
routine workings of the police – patrolling, investigating, tracking, capturing, and even 
killing (Chamayou, 2012; Neocleous, this volume).  Although the practice of the police 
manhunt is often associated with high-profile, media-driven pursuits, most recently 
observed with the organized hunts for ex-LAPD cop Christopher Dorner and the two 
Chechen-born brother suspects in the Boston Marathon bombing, we should resist seeing 
the hunt as only or even primarily as a form of spectacle.  That is, policing as 
fundamentally the practice of hunting human prey is best attested to by the routine, 
normalized, and hence often invisible, operation of police power.  As one writer for a 
police magazine affirms, “Law enforcement exists to keep society safe from criminals, 
which means apprehending and arresting those who would do harm. Police manhunts for 
wanted criminals are daily occurrences throughout America and Canada. Most manhunts 
are routine police work and garner little public attention” (O’Brien 2009; emphasis mine). 
Because the manhunt is a practice of the powerful hunting the relatively powerless, the 
police hunt for human prey, like all forms of manhunting, performs a far-reaching 
asymmetry in terms of the resources and means of tracking (Chamayou, 2012), and this is 
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epitomized by vertical security technologies such as the police helicopter and now the 
police drone.   
Police drones extend the traditional police hunt in powerful ways by augmenting 
the grounded patrol agent with a vertical optic of advanced tracking technology. An 
unmanned systems editor for Janes Defence Weekly has stated that drones “could be used 
for anything you currently use a police helicopter for, so to follow a car chase, or to find a 
suspect who is hiding or for search and rescue missions.  The cameras they carry can be 
very sophisticated, they can lock onto a car and follow it, without having someone 
constantly monitoring the pictures. They can then be transmitted back to police HQ” 
(Elgot, 2012).  One Miami-Herald journalist, perhaps unwittingly but nevertheless 
tellingly, articulates police drones as manhunting technology when he writes that the 
local police drone has the capability of “training powerful lenses on its prey” (Rabin, 
2011).   The website for Vanguard Industries offers a short video promoting their 
Shadowhawk to “public safety” agencies that positions the viewer to see from the aerial 
view as the unmanned system engages in mock scenarios of the police hunt.  In one 
scenario, titled “Tactical Night Time Ops: Officer Directed to Suspect”, the viewer 
observes thermal imaging technology illuminating a human body hiding in what appears 
to be a wooded area.  Over the radio we hear the suspect referred to as a target, as the 
drone operator guides a terrestrial officer to the precise location of the hunted.   We then 
see the officer, silhouette illuminated with his weapon drawn, approaching the suspect as 
the human prey kneels as the officer arrests – a hunt and then a capture.   Interestingly, a 
Monmouth University survey (2012) found that 67% of US citizens supported the use of 
police drones to track down “runaway criminals” and 64% supported drones policing 
“illegal immigration”.   
To further push this argument we only need to consider that the move to 
weaponize police drones has already begun before the exclusively surveillance variety has 
become common in US skies.  This is not all that surprising if we recall the bombings of 
Blair Mountain and MOVE headquarters, and more directly, the fact that military drones 
developed first as surveillance technologies and only later germinated into the hunter-
killer drone.  For example, the police version of the Shadowhawk can be armed with a 
taser and a stun baton.  As one journalist reports: “The most relevant weapon for chasing 
fugitives might be the beanbag launcher. Its ammunition, though, isn’t called a beanbag; 
it’s a ‘stun baton’”. A Vanguard official stated:  "You have a stun baton where you can 
actually engage somebody at altitude with the aircraft. A stun baton would essentially 
disable a suspect" (Moore, 2011) – here the coercive violence underpinning routine 
policing is buttressed by the capability to not only track but to literally capture with a 
potential debilitating blow to the hunted suspect.  In a report on military UAV 
applications for domestic policing, two military researchers discuss a military training 
exercise experimenting with a “UAV non-lethal payload” that “is directly relevant to 
civilian police missions.”  Here they discuss that with little training, an individual agent 
45
 WALL: Unmanning the Police Manhunt 
 
was successful in dropping “smoke canisters, steel spikes for destroying tires, and 
propaganda leaflets, all with incredible precision” (Murphy and Cycon, no date 
provided).   Although commonly mentioned police drone “payloads” are “less than 
lethal” such as tasers, tear gas, high-pitch sound weapons, and rubber bullets, it is not 
hard to imagine police drones with firearm capabilities – as the non-police version of the 
Shadowhawk is equipped with a 12-gauge shotgun and grenade launcher that has been 
deployed to hunt Somali “pirates” in the Gulf of Aden.  Interestingly, this move to 
weaponize police drones coincides with the US military’s increasing emphasis on 
weaponizing its own micro-UAVs – as exemplified with AeroVironment’s Switchblade.   
In South Carolina, two agencies joined forces to create a surveillance drone that allegedly 
can also be weaponized, according to the Sheriff:  “We do have the capability of putting a 
weapon on there if we needed to…We could put one on there.  Hopefully we would never 
have to use it” (Talarico, 2011).  In the candid language of a professional hunter of 
humans, the Sheriff stated, “This is an example of where jurisdictional boundaries are 
broken down for a criminal…Quite simply put, they can't run" (Talarico, 2011). 
Manhunts always risk a certain embarrassment for the state as they expose the state’s 
failure of non-capture (Chamayou, 2012), and here we can see how police drones are 
imagined as one possibility of reducing this potential public humiliation. 
Although drones are only just now emerging as domestic policing technology and 
therefore unmanned manhunts exist, as of now anyway, primarily in a police imaginary, 
there are already concrete examples of unmanned manhunts.  In what is probably the first 
time a police drone actively assisted in the arrest of a suspect, in 2009 the Texas 
Department of Public Safety used the Wasp III to assist a SWAT team in executing a 
search warrant on a home that they believed had weapons and drugs inside and 
eventually the pursued man was arrested (Newton, 2011).  In 2010 an unmanned hunt 
took place in Britain when a vehicle was allegedly stolen and one of the two suspects 
successfully outran police, who claimed to lose sight of the suspect in a thick fog.  
Merseyside police then deployed a small drone with body heat detection:  “Using its 
thermal imaging equipment the device quickly located its target in bushes beside the 
canal through his body heat and relayed live pictures to a police van nearby. Foot patrols 
then went and arrested him” (Hull, 2010).  The anti-social behavior taskforce official 
stated: “These arrests demonstrate the value of having something like the UAV.”   But the 
aerial hunt of domestic suspects is not monopolized by the police themselves, as attested 
to by the fact that in 2011 a US Predator drone assisted North Dakota police in the 
surveillance and arrest of cattle ranchers (Bennett, 2011).  While looking for several 
missing cows on a 3, 000 acre farm, the county Sheriff was chased off the property by 
three men with rifles.   The next day a Predator drone from the local air force base was 
called in, along with a SWAT team and bomb squad and additional officers from nearby 
departments.  Flying 2 miles overhead, the Predator’s powerful surveillance system was 
able to locate the ranchers and discern that they were unarmed – the 3 men were then 
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arrested in a police raid (Bennett, 2011).  Although this specific case of using military 
drones domestically was challenged in court, a judge controversially ruled in favor of the 
state (Koebler, 2012).  Furthermore, following media reporting of this event, state 
authorities admitted that not only do Predator drones frequently assist this particular 
police department but that Predators are used in domestic investigations by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (Bennett, 
2011).  As the LA Times reports, “Officials in charge of the fleet cite broad authority to 
work with police from budget requests to Congress that cite "interior law enforcement 
support" as part of their mission” (Bennett, 2011).  Similarly, it has been reported that 
military drone operators in Nevada have trained by practicing their aerial tracking 
techniques on civilian vehicles driving on US roadways.  Upon observing this firsthand, a 
journalist inquired:  ““Wait, you guys practice tracking enemies by using civilian cars?”  A 
training exercise only, said the Air Force officer (Mazzetti, 2012).    
This movement towards the unmanned hunt is also illustrated by what police say 
they are going to use them for.  In Maryland, a police department stated in official FAA 
documents that a drone would be deployed to aerially monitor “people of interest 
(watching open drug market transactions before initiating an arrest)” as well as “aerial 
observation of houses when serving warrants”, the searching for marijuana fields, and 
search and rescue missions.  Similarly, an Arkansas department has stated in FAA 
documents that their drone is equipped with powerful infrared and zoom cameras that 
can pan and tilt in order to “track objects of interest even when the helicopter’s nose is 
pointed away from the object.”  Montgomery County police’s Shadowhawk will be used 
to “enhance and support tactical operations”, such as “SWAT and narcotics operations 
will utilize camera and FLIR systems to provide real time area surveillance of the target 
during high risk operations.”  Alabama police purchased a drone “In response to the need 
for situational awareness and intelligence” that will be deployed “in response to a specific 
dedicated law enforcement mission in a defined area” such as “covert surveillance of drug 
transactions” along with “pre-operational planning and surveillance, maintaining 
operational security, and obtaining evidentiary video”.  In Ogden City, Utah, a small city 
with just over 82,000 residents, local authorities asked the FAA to approve, although 
ultimately denied, the use of a “nocturnal surveillance airship” that would provide “law 
enforcement of high crime areas” with hopes of identifying “suspicious activity.”3  As 
these examples clearly demonstrate, the police themselves articulate the police drone as 
first and foremost tracking and pursuit technology – not a technology only for an abstract 
aerial view, but a grounded, normalized police practice of targeting.  This clearly provides 
                                                          
3 Political activists have been concerned about the police use of drones to pacify protests and public dissent.   
And since the manhunt is always vulnerable to a reversal of roles between hunted and hunter (Chamayou, 
2012), it is unsurprising that activists have started deploying their own counter-surveillance (see Monahan, 
2006) drones during political protests (Ackerman, 2011). 
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the police a powerful new tool to track and capture whoever it deems suspicious, yet the 
drone imaginary outlined above – “criminals”, “fugitives”, drugs, “high crime areas”, 
“suspicious activity” – predict that policing’s unmanned manhunt is predisposed to 
tracking and capturing the poor and downtrodden.   
Unmanned hunting never exists outside of the political, economic, and cultural 
configurations that form subjects as objects.  “Seeing more only means having more 
suspects”, as Knechtel puts it (2006: 21).  In other words, drone systems are incapable of 
an impartial objectivity, but rather perform a “techno-cultural production of targets” 
(Gregory 2011, 173) where institutional mandates, cultural logics, political rationalities, 
and technological limits circumscribe the very rules of delivering state surveillance and 
violence.  Today the drone is the quintessential visual prosthetic that forges political 
subjects asymmetrically through the narrow optics of tracking and targeting 
measurements and the contextual deficiencies of political economy and cultural 
inscriptions.  Unmanning the police manhunt is loaded with violence regardless of 
individual drone capability as they only exist in relation to the broader organizational 
animus of state power.   
The founding act of police was the hunting of the poor, vagrants, beggars and the 
colonized (Chamayou, 2012; Neocleous, 2013b; see also Sheldon, 2008). This history still 
weighs on the present, and the drone needs to be situated within this history, a history 
which is, in effect, the history of pacification. Let me finish with a recent experience to 
highlight this point.  
While I was amongst a group of police officers one day, an officer brought up how 
he had recently watched on CNN a police helicopter hunt down a fleeing suspect.  This 
quickly morphed into a brief comment on police helicopters, specifically how the LAPD 
air units notoriously instill fear into residents.  Yet this quickly then morphed into how, 
as one officer stated, in the near future aerial drones would be the preferred choice for 
providing vertical security. Another officer, echoing media reports, expressed how micro-
police drones would be able to fit in the trunk of a patrol car and deployed at the officers 
whim.   On this, one officer joked how he would like to someday intentionally crash his 
hypothetical drone into what is essentially the “ghetto” part of the city in order to literally 
wipe them “off the map”, while the other officers laughed at the thought.   
As this example suggests, and as Chamayou (2012) argues, the hunt has long 
induced great pleasure in those doing the hunting while the hunted prey exists and moves 
through space in a constant state of anxiety, largely due to the “radical dissymmetry” in 
the technologies of tracking.  For those living under the drone stare in warzones abroad, 
such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Occupied Territories, fear and nightmares define 
their experience.  Although it is too early to completely understand the specific ways 
police drones might also induce fear and terror into citizens of the Global North, the 
alarm and dread produced by police helicopters in the vertical patrolling of urban space is 
a useful parallel that points to the affective trepidation potentially provoked in a near 
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future with ubiquitous unmanned policing.  In many ways, even those bourgeois 
communities and citizens usually eclipsed from the police gaze will come under the stare 
of unmanned policing, to the extent that air power obliterates any useful distinctions 
between suspect and bystander, target and non-target.  As one LA journalist wrote in 
1992, “Hearing LAPD helicopters circle overhead is a nightly phenomenon over much of 
the Los Angeles basin, even in middle-class neighborhoods like my own…the helicopters 
contribute to the perception that something is very wrong with this city”.  He continues:   
 
Their circular flight patterns have a way of making people feel as if they're 
smack in the center of a crime drama. They get under people's skin in a 
way that the soaring crime statistics can't…every time the helicopters 
hover and circle overhead I'm reminded of my anxieties. I was insecure 
before the Los Angeles riots. Now the sight and sound of helicopters above 
compounds the tension (Strausser, 1992).   
 
 If this is the case for this seemingly privileged journalist, it is certainly true that the 
captives of wage labor, the dispossessed, perpetually hunted poor will burden the brunt of 
any aerially-induced terror and fear.  The aerially-induced anxiety of the police helicopter 
hunt is best depicted in the rapper Ice Cube’s song, “Ghetto Bird”, where he writes “Why, 
oh why must you swoop through the hood like everybody from the hood is up to no 
good” and “Run, run, run from the ghetto bird Run”.   This is not meant to jeopardize the 
suffering of those who are “living and dying under drones” by the hunter-killer Predators 
and Reapers by turning their suffering into “our own”.  But it is to suggest that domestic 
policing’s unmanned manhunt is also circumscribed by not dissimilar relations of 
domination that is generative of its own peculiar patterns of physical and psychic 
insecurity. 
 I am arguing, then, that the police drone underlines the power relations between 
those that are dominated and those that do the dominating, the hunted and the hunters. 
Within this relation stand the everyday hunters that are the police.  The rise of police 
drones makes more perceptible this radical asymmetry between the techniques of the 
hunters and the hunted, or brings this relation of domination to the forefront, in similar 
but in even more dramatic fashion than the SWAT team or armored vehicle.  As a 
nascent verticality organizing state suspicion, tracking, and capture, the unmanning of 
the police manhunt is but the newest symbolic marker of the pacification project that the 
poor and oppressed have been living and dying with all along.  But the very notion of 
pacification always presupposes populations that resist and is therefore never a 
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